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1ARTICLE XXI:  RESERVATIONS
by Graham S. Pearson*  & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles in the draft
Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and are unlikely
to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the end-game.   It
is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation Papers which will
consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the Protocol."   This Evaluation
Paper continues this series by considering Article XXI Reservations  on which the AHG has
made good progress with the current rolling text containing three sets of square brackets.
Article XXI




[The Articles of this Protocol [shall not be subject to reservations] [incompatible
with its object and purpose or that of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972]. The Annexes and Appendices of this Protocol shall not be subject to
reservations incompatible with its object and purpose or that of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.]
The strikethrough version of Article XXI provided3 by the FOC on Legal Issues for further
consideration proposes removal of the square brackets together with a streamlining of the
reference to the Convention as follows:
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1Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc
2United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part I), 30 July 1999, Geneva.
2ARTICLE XXI
RESERVATIONS
[ The Articles of this Protocol [ shall not be subject to reservations ] [ incompatible
with its object and purpose or that of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972 Convention ]. The Annexes and Appendices of this Protocol shall not be
subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose or that of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972  Convention.]
Evaluation
4.   The BTWC4 made no attempt to prohibit or limit reservations.  In this respect, as in many
others, its formal structure and especially its final clauses were modelled on the 1971 Sea Bed
Treaty5, which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had negotiated in 1969 and
1970 immediately prior to the BTWC, and which in turn reflected the language of the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty6.
5.  Prohibition of reservations was introduced in Article XXII of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)7  which states:
ARTICLE XXII
RESERVATIONS
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of
this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and
purpose.
and repeated in Article XV of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)8 which states:
                                                                                                                                                       
3United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
4United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
5Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.   Available at
http://www.acda.gov/treaties/seabed1. htm
6United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty Series, Vol. 729, I. No. 10485,
168-175, 1970.
7Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.nl
8Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
3ARTICLE XV
RESERVATIONS
The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The
provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be
subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.
6.   However, in neither case was the prohibition fully comprehensive.   In the CWC it was
absolute in respect of the Articles of the Convention, but not the Annexes.   In the CTBT it
was absolute in respect of the Treaty and its Annexes, but not the Protocol or Annexes to the
Protocol.   Instead, any reservations to the CWC Annexes must meet the test of not being
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and any reservations to the
CTBT Protocol or Annexes to the Protocol must not be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Treaty.
7.   If all the square brackets are removed from the BTWC Protocol Article XXI, a similar test
would be required for any reservations to the Annexes or Appendices to the Protocol.
Namely, that they must not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol or
that of the BTWC.
8.   In respect of the Articles of the Protocol itself, there are currently two alternatives in the
current rolling text:  an absolute ban on reservations or a conditional ban.   In the latter case,
the condition would be the same test as is proposed for any reservations to the Annexes or
Appendices -- that they must not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol
or that of the BTWC.
9.   The words object and purpose  are familiar from Article XVIII of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties9 under which the States Signatories to a treaty which is
subject to ratification are under the minimal obligation to refrain from acts which would
defeat  the object and purpose of the treaty  so long as future ratification has not been ruled
out.   However, the words object and purpose  are not without problems.   As Walter
Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp have pointed out in their commentary10 on Article XXII of the
CWC, there is no authoritative definition of the object and purpose of that Convention, so any
test of compatibility will be necessarily subjective and arguments over it will be inconclusive.
10.  They also draw attention to other ambiguities in the CWC compromise.  Thus, it is left
unclear how a State may object to a reservation to the CWC Annexes on the grounds that it is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention or repudiate such an objection.
Krutzsch and Trapp point out that If there were different reservations by different Signatories
objected to by different Signatories, the result would be an absolute confusion and a
destruction of the unity of the Convention.11   They proceed to note the decision-making
procedure in CWC Article XV Amendments  and comment that:
                                                
9Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.    Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/
texts/BH408.txt
10Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, p.250-251.
11Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, p.250
4It might be concluded that this intention existed also with regard to reservations, yet
was not sufficiently expressed in the text of Article XXII, which was hardly discussed
in its final version.
According to this interpretation, if there were objections to a reservation it would be
up to the Signatories to decide together whether an objection on the grounds of
incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention
should take effect.   A majority decision of the signatories  (sic, lower case s) should
determine the validity of the reservation erga omnes.
11.  Finally, Krutzsch and Trapp draw attention to the problem that no clear line can be drawn
separating those provisions of the CWC Annexes which have a bearing on the object and
purpose of the Convention from those which do not.   Consideration of paragraph 4 of CWC
Article XV Amendments  which states that:
4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Convention,
provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph
5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical
nature. All changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with
paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification
Annex, and those definitions in Part I of the Verification Annex which relate
exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be subject to changes in accordance
with paragraph 5.
suggests that reservations to the provisions in Annexes governing declaration, verification
and confidentiality obligations may be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose
of the Convention and consequently objectionable12 but this, too, is left ambiguous.
Consequently, the CWC model is not necessarily one to be followed in the Protocol Article
XXI.
12.   A straightforward ban on reservations applied overall by language such as The Articles
of and the Annexes and Appendices to this Protocol shall not be subject to reservations
would have the virtue of simplicity.   This alone will ensure that all eventual States Parties to
the Protocol enter into the same set of obligations.   It would also have the advantage of
consistency with Article XVI Status of the Annexes and Appendices  because, if all the
Annexes and Appendices really do form an integral part of the Protocol  as proclaimed in
Article XVI, they should enjoy equally full protection against damage by reservation.   This
will be all the more important if, as may be expected, the Ad Hoc Group ends up including in
the Annexes and Appendices some matters of substance crucial to the credibility and
successful operation of the Protocol, for example, in relation to Investigations and to
Confidentiality.
13.    Even with such absolute bans on reservations, the principle of common obligation may
be circumvented.   The CWC, as already noted, allowed no reservations in respect of the
Articles of the Convention.   Yet the ratification debates in the United States Senate in 1997
leant heavily on the negotiation with the Executive Branch of conditions purporting to limit
                                                
12Walter Krutzsch & Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994, p.251
5US implementation in specific ways13 -- even including a purported repudiation of the ban in
Article XXII of the CWC on reservations to the Articles of the Convention.  Indeed in the
first of 28 conditions, the United States Senate stated14 that:
The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention is subject to the following conditions which shall be binding on the
President:
(1)  EFFECT OF ARTICLE XXII -- Upon the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the
United States has informed all other States parties to the Convention that the
Senate reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to
give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention subject to
reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.
The Presidential certification15 states:
I hereby certify that:
In connection with Condition (1),  Effect of Article XXII, the United States has
informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves
the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to give its advice
and consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations,
notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.
14.   Another Senate condition is regarded by the OPCW as a substantial problem16; this is
Condition (18) which reads as follows:
(18) LABORATORY SAMPLE ANALYSIS - Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that no sample
collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for
analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.
The subsequent Presidential certification17 states that In connection with Condition (18),
Laboratory Sample Analysis, no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the
Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.   This was then carried forward into a statement18 made upon ratification by the
United States which stated that:
                                                
13The list of 28 conditions subject to which the US Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification by the
United States of the CWC can be found in United States Senate, Executive Resolution 75, Chemical Weapons
Convention, 24 April 1997.   Available on the web at http://www.stimson.org/cwc/s-75.htm
14United States Senate, Executive Resolution 75, Chemical Weapons Convention, 24 April 1997.   Available on
the web at http://www.stimson.org/cwc/s-75.htm
15The White House, To the Congress of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 April 1997.
Available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/4/28/11.text.1
16Arms Control Today, The CWC at the Two-Year Mark: An Interview with Dr John Gee, Arms Control Today,
April/May 1999, pp.3-9.
17The White House, To the Congress of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 April 1997.
Available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/4/28/11.text.1
18Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW:  The Legal Texts, ed. Lisa Woollomes
Tabassi, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 1999, p. 114.
6"....[the] ratification of the Convention, with Annexes, [is] subject to the condition
which relates to the Annexe on Implementation and Verification, that no sample
collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for
analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States"
As noted in our Evaluation Paper on Article XX Entry into Force19, this is a damaging
condition as one of the key requirements for ensuring that the CWC is a strong Convention is
to ensure that any samples resulting from a challenge inspection shall be independently
analysed in two internationally accredited laboratories with the possibility of analysis in a
third internationally accredited laboratory should there be disagreement between the results
from the first two laboratories.
15.  In addition to these Senate conditions, another qualification which is contrary to both the
spirit and the letter of the CWC was imposed in the US legislation to implement the CWC:
this is Section 307 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act20 which states:
SEC. 307.  NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION.
Consistent with the objective of eliminating chemical weapons, the President may
deny a request to inspect any facility in the United States in cases where the President
determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the national security interests of
the United States.
This is in contradiction to CWC Article IX  Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding
which is quite clear that there is no right of refusal. The section of Article IX headed
Procedures for challenge inspections   states that:
11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and
in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the
inspected State Party shall have:
(a)The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate
its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection
team to fulfil its mandate;
(b)The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole
purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
compliance; and
(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this
Convention.
and makes it clear that States Parties are obliged to provide access.
                                                
19Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XX:  Entry into Force,  Evaluation Paper No. 5, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
20United States Congress, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999.,
Public Law 105-277, 21 October 1998.  The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998  is on
pages 856-887.   Public Law 105-277 is available on the web at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/
publaw/105publ.html
716.  Whatever may or may not be the international legal standing of such conditions, they
constitute a political fact; and they demonstrate that devices other than reservations, may be
employed openly to reinterpret obligations, thereby weakening the treaty regime, in ways
that other States Parties may find disconcerting but can do nothing to remedy.
17.   It was in order to make harder the circumvention of a ban on reservations that the
negotiators of the CWC were, in 1989-90, considering, in Appendix II material, papers
reflecting the results of work undertaken so far on issues in the Convention, the following
possible provisions21:
1.   No reservations or exceptions, however phrased or named, [including
interpretative statements or declarations], may be made to this Convention [unless
expressly permitted by other provisions of the Convention].
2.    The provision in paragraph 1 above does not preclude a State when signing,
ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making statements or declarations,
however phrased or named, provided that such statements or declarations do not
purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in
their application to that State.   
Language of this kind will be necessary if the BTWC Protocol is to guard against
circumvention of its ban on reservations.   Even then, it will not be proof against determined
circumvention.  But it will send a stronger signal than if such language is not included.
18.   The one advantage of reservation, if circumvention by other devices is not ruled out, is
that they are formal statements to which formal objections can be registered in a procedure
recognized as part of international law.   Thus, on 18 August 1976, the United States formally
objected to one of the reservations attached by Switzerland to its ratification of the BTWC on
4 May 1976.22   It made no objection to the other Swiss reservation, which -- like Austria's
reservation on its ratification of the BTWC on 10 August 1973 -- alluded to the obligations
arising from its status of permanent neutrality, and noted that this status would limit what it
was able to do as a State Party to the BTWC, especially under Article VII or any similar or
supplementary arrangement for collective assistance.   Austria's reservation added a reference
to its UN membership.23
19.   This Swiss reservation to which the United States objected had to do with the second
part of the prohibition in Article I of the BTWC --weapons, equipment or means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  Switzerland
reserved the right to decide for itself what this prohibition covered, because of the problems
that Switzerland foresaw in defining the scope of the Convention as Switzerland considered
that it would be hard to distinguish weapons, equipment or means of delivery specifically
designed for the use of biological agents and toxins from other weapons, equipment or means
of delivery which might be used legitimately by armed forces.24   The United States, while
                                                
21United Nations, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament
on its work during the period 16 January to 1 February 1990, CD/961, 1 February 1990, p.198.
22Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control:  A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements,  Taylor & Francis for
SIPRI, London, 1978, p.194.
23Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control:  A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements,  Taylor & Francis for
SIPRI, London, 1978, p.193.
24Martin Muller, Private communication, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern, Switzerland, 16 August
1999.
8conceding the uncertainty, objected that it did not constitute sufficient reason for States to
reserve unilaterally the right to decide which weapons, equipment or means of delivery fell
within the definition.25
20.   On balance, however, it is highly desirable that the language in the BTWC Protocol send
a clear signal to governments that reservations are unacceptably damaging.   Only this
suffices to ensure that all eventual States Parties do enter into the same set of obligations.
The preferred option is thus a comprehensive overall ban on reservations  The Articles of and
the Annexes and Appendices to this Protocol shall not be subject to reservations.    To try to
distinguish between the Articles and the Annexes and Appendices is to undermine Article
XVI of the Protocol which specifically states that Any reference to this Protocol  includes the
Annexes and the Appendices.
21.  In addition, in the light of the CWC experience, there would be benefit in adding
language similar to that being considered26 in 1989 - 90 for the CWC to the effect that:
1.   No reservations or exceptions, however phrased or named, [including
interpretative statements or declarations], may be made to this Convention [unless
expressly permitted by other provisions of the Convention].
2.    The provision in paragraph 1 above does not preclude a State when signing,
ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making statements or declarations,
however phrased or named, provided that such statements or declarations do not
purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in
their application to that State.   
22.   The latter part of paragraph 2 in the draft CWC text above echoes the definition of
reservation  in Article 2.1 (d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties27:
(d)  'reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State;
23.   For the BTWC Protocol, it would be prudent to draw on the same definition, to show
what needs to be prevented, whether a formal reservation or another device is used;  and to
add the word conditions  in order to signal clearly that the ban on reservations is not to be
circumvented by adding conditions either.   The following sentence is therefore recommended
to be added to Article XXI:
In addition, no exceptions or conditions, however phrased or named, including
interpretative statements or declarations, which purport to exclude or modify the
legal effect of the provisions of the Articles and the Annexes and Appendices of this
                                                
25Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control:  A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements,  Taylor & Francis for
SIPRI, London, 1978, p.194.
26United Nations, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament
on its work during the period 16 January to 1 February 1990, CD/961, 1 February 1990, p.198.
27Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.    Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/
texts/BH408.txt
9Protocol in their application to any State, may be made by any State upon signing,
ratifying or acceding to this Protocol.
Strike-through text for Article XXI




[The Articles of this Protocol [shall not be subject to reservations] [incompatible
with its object and purpose or that of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972]. and the Annexes and Appendices of this Protocol shall not be subject to
reservations. incompatible with its object and purpose or that of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.]  In addition, no exceptions or conditions,
however phrased or named, including interpretative statements or declarations,
which purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Articles
and the Annexes and Appendices of this Protocol in their application to any State,
may be made by any State upon signing, ratifying or acceding to this Protocol.
